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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) of the Utah Code Annotated (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court correctly determined that the Summit County 
Board of Adjustment's interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code was 
purely a question of law to be reviewed for correctness? (R. 365-66, 369, 375-78, 
427-30). The trial court's interpretation of the law is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
797, 800 (Utah App. 1992). 
II. Whether the trial court correctly determined, as a matter of law, that the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code does not require a formal site plan approval 
process as a prerequisite for obtaining a Building Permit for a permitted use within the 
Resort Commercial Zone District? (R. 365-66, 369, 378-89, 427-30). The trial court's 
interpretations of local ordinances is reviewed for correctness while the Board of 
Adjustment's decision is reviewed for a determination of whether the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal based upon the substantial evidence in the administrative 
record. Webb v. Ninow. 883 P.2d 1365, 1376 (Utah App. 1994); Town of Alta, 836 
P.2d at 800; Pena, 869 P.2d at 936; Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah App. 1995). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The determinative statutes and rules include (i) Sections 17-27-708 and 17-27-
1001 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953 f as amended), set forth in Addendum A to 
Appellant's Brief; (ii) the Snyderville Basin Development Code, set forth in full in the 
Addendum to Appellee's Brief; (iii) the Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines, 
Resolution 9 3 - 1 , set forth in the Addendum to Appellee's Brief; and (iv) Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, set forth in Addendum D to Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from Plaintiff and Appellee Red Barn Development, L.C.'s ("Red 
Barn") petition for judicial review of the Summit County Board of Adjustment's ("Board 
of Adjustment" or "Board") denial of Red Barn's application for a building permit 
based upon the Board of Adjustment's interpretation of the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code (the "Development Code"). The Board of Adjustment had 
previously denied Red Barn's request for a building permit and upheld the Director of 
Community Development's (the "Director") decision that a preliminary and final site 
plan approval was required for the permitted use intended by Red Barn. (R. 9). 
Red Barn filed a Complaint seeking judicial review by the Third District Court of 
Summit County of the Board of Adjustment's decision (R. 1-11). Both Red Barn and 
Summit County filed motions for summary judgment (R. 36-37, 41-360, 365-66, 369-
90). After hearing oral argument by both counsel and reviewing the respective 
motions and memorandum in support of the motions for summary judgment, the trial 
court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, thereby granting Red 
Barn's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Summit County's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment (R. 427-30). From this Order, dated October 29, 1997, Summit 
County has appealed (R. 431-33). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Red Barn is the owner of real property located at 4137 North Highway 224 
(West Side) , Summit Count, Utah. Red Barn intends to construct on that property 15 
lodge type buildings consisting of 57 Units which would be rented on a nightly or 
periodic basis. Red Barn does not currently intend to divide ownership of any portion 
of the real property. (R. 303). Red Barn's intended use of the property is a Permitted 
Use with a "Resort Commercial" Zone as set forth in the Development Code (R. 303). 
The Development Code sets forth the procedures for obtaining building permits 
within the Snyderville Basin and in doing so sets forth differing procedures depending 
upon whether the development is a permitted use or a conditional use within certain 
zones. 
Section 3.1 (b) (8) of the Development Code provides: 
The RC [Resort Commercial] Zoning District is designed to 
accommodate retail commercial and residential uses oriented to 
major destination resort development including resort retail ships, 
grocery stores, restaurants, condominiums, overnight lodging units 
and comparable resort facilities and services, (emphasis added) 
(R. 210-11). There is no dispute that Red Barn's intended use of the property is a 
permitted use (R. 9-10, 33). 
Section 3.5 (d) of the Development Code specifies in pertinent part as fol lows: 
Limitation on Uses. Uses shall be limited to those identified in the 
Schedule of Uses as a Permitted Use or Conditional Use. . . . 
(R. 208). 
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Section 3.6, identifying the Schedule of Uses provides as fol lows: 
(a) Schedule of-Efifmitifid-Uses. Tho Schedule of Permittnd Uses 
("Schedule") prescribes the allowable uses within each zoning 
district. The purposes of the Schedule of J?s£mi££ed~ Uses is to 
implement the Land use policies of the General Plan, Land Use 
Element. The Permitted Uses, Conditional Uses, Non-designated 
Uses, and Prohibited Uses within each zoning district shall be as 
prescribed in the Schedule. . . . The following rules shall be used 
to interpret the Schedule of-Pefm^ted Uses: 
(1) If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted 
subject to the general requirements for specified uses within the 
zoning district, this Chapter, and the applicable performance 
standards set forth in Chapter 5 of this Code. No permitted use 
shall be established until all required permits are obtained includ-
ing, at a minimum, a-fetttteto^ development permit. 
(2) If the Symbol "C" appears in the cell, the use is only 
permitted subject to the conditional use permit procedures and 
standards specified in Section 3.7 herein, the performance 
standards set forth in Chapter 5 of this code and any other 
standards set forth in this Code which may be applicable to such 
use. 
(R. 207-08). 
After prior submissions to Summit County, on March 2 1 , 1997, Red Barn made 
a letter request for issuance of building permits and submitted wi th that request an 
Application for Final Site Plan Approval, as requested by Summit County (R. 3-4, 9). 
The letter also requested the Director to notify Red Barn if additional information was 
necessary to process the request. At the time of the application Red Barn paid all filing 
fees necessary to process the application, even though Red Barn contended that an 
Application for Final Site Plan Approval was not required for a permitted use pursuant 
to the Development Code (R. 9). 
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The Director responded by letter dated April 15, 1997 indicating that Red Barn's 
application would be treated as a request for preliminary plat approval and that the 
request for building permits would be denied. The Director explained that it was 
necessary for Red Barn to obtain both a preliminary and final site plan approval for the 
permitted use. The Director did not say that Red Barn would have to apply for 
subdivision approval. Summit County made no other objection to Red Barn's 
Application (R. 1-2, 9). 
Red Barn appealed the Director's decision to the Board of Adjustment asserting 
that no preliminary plat or final plat approval was required for a permitted use under 
the Development Code and that based upon the absence of any objection to Red 
Barn's application, building permits should be immediately issued (R. 8). On May 22, 
1997 and on June 19, 1997, after Red Barn and Summit County had submitted 
written material and oral presentations to the Board of Adjustment, the Board of 
Adjustment considered the appeal of Red Barn and determined by a vote of four (4) 
to one (1) to uphold the Director's decision to deny Red Barn's application (R. 8, 52-
54, 254-388) . Thereafter, Red Barn filed a Complaint in the Summit County Third 
District Court seeking review of the Board of Adjustment's decision (R. 1-11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Red Barn's argument on appeal is divided into two sections. The first section 
addresses whether the trial court employed the proper standard for reviewing the 
Board of Adjustment's decision. While Summit County claims on appeal that the 
Board of Adjustment's decision "carries a statutory presumption of validity and is 
afforded broad judicial deference" (Appellant's Brief at 17), Summit County entirely 
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fails to address the fact that the Board of Adjustment's decision was purely an 
interpretation of the Development Code, which is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. It is the position of Red Barn that the interpretation of a county ordinance 
is a question of law which courts uniformly review for correctness. Accordingly, it 
was entirely proper for the trial court to review the Board of Adjustment's decision for 
correctness without affording deference to the Board's findings. 
The second section of Red Barn's argument concerns the correct interpretation 
of the Development Code. Red Barn contends, and the trial court agreed, that the 
Development Code does not require a preliminary site plan and final site plan approval 
process for a development which is a permitted use within the applicable zone. The 
Development Code is clearly divided into portions which specifically refer to 
requirements for uses which are permitted and uses which are conditional within the 
applicable zone. Those portions of the Development Code which specifically refer to 
permitted uses do not require a preliminary or final site plan approval process. 
Conversely, Summit County attempts to rewrite the Development Code, through 
its tortured interpretation, so as to impose requirements upon Red Barn which are not 
contained within the plain language of the Development Code. By so interpreting the 
Development Code, the Board of Adjustment has acted in a manner which is contrary 
to law. The Development Code does not require Red Barn to go through the lengthy 
process of obtaining preliminary and final site plan approval prior to obtaining building 
permits. Therefore, it was an illegal act of Summit County to hold Red Barn to a 
standard which was not imposed by law and the trial court properly reversed the Board 
of Adjustment's decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED THE BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOP-
MENT CODE FOR CORRECTNESS. 
Summit County asserts, and Red Barn agrees that when reviewing the decision 
of a board of adjustment, a trial court may determine "only whether or not the decision 
is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (emphasis added) U.C.A. § 17-27-1001(3) (1953, 
as amended). The distinction Summit County consistently fails to make, however, is 
that when determining whether the Board of Adjustment's interpretation of the county 
ordinance was illegal, the trial court's review of the interpretation is for correctness. 
If the Board of Adjustment incorrectly interpreted the county ordinance, application of 
the ordinance under an incorrect interpretation is illegal. 
As this Court determined in Patterson vs. Utah County Board of Adjustment, , 
"whether or not the Board's decision is illegal depends on a proper interpretation and 
application of the law." 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1995). In Patterson, this 
Court stated that whether the Board's decision was illegal was a matter for the court's 
determination for which no deference was given to the board or to the trial court. Id. 
Interpretation of an ordinance is a matter of law which is in the province of the courts, 
not the executive branch of government. 
Clearly, in matters where a trial court is considering whether a board of 
adjustment has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the trial court must affirm the board's 
actions if supported by substantial evidence. In the present controversy however, the 
trial court was not reviewing a factual determination made by the Board of Adjust-
ment, the trial court was reviewing only the Board's interpretation of the Development 
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Code. The proper interpretation and application of the Development Code-or whether 
the Board acted illegally—is a function for the courts for which no deference is given 
to the Board of Adjustment. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 602. 
While Summit County correctly cites that Board actions are accorded substantial 
deference and will be rejected on appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to be 
arbitrary and capricious or if they violate the law (Appellant's Brief at 21), and that the 
trial court "cannot substitute its own views and conclusions for that of the Board, as 
it relates to its exercise of discretion in land use decisions" (R. 354), Summit County's 
reliance upon these stated principals is simply misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court 
reject the identical argument in the matter of Sandy City vs. Salt Lake County, 827 
P.2d. 212 (Utah 1992). 
In Sandy City, the trial court first and the Utah Supreme Court second were 
required to interpret sections of the Utah Code regarding the development of land in 
unincorporated areas adjacent to municipalities. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Furthermore, we note that the County errs in cautioning us 
to defer to the board of county commissioners' legal conclusion 
that the Chevron project and the larger commercial subdivision of 
which it is only one part are not urban development under section 
10-2-418. This is not a case in which we are attempting to 
second-guess the County's lawful exercise of legislatively dele-
gated discretion. [Citations omitted.] In this case, we are deciding 
whether the County overstepped the bounds of its legislatively 
delegated authority. The interpretation of section 10-2-418 and 
10-1-104 . . . are pure questions of law. The County's technical 
experience in planning and zoning is of no relevance in deciding 
these legal issues. 
827 P.2d at 218 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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A similar conclusion was reached by the Utah Court of Appeals in Town of Alta 
v. Ben Hame Corporation, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). When interpreting a Salt 
Lake County Ordinance, the Court stated: 
Just as the interpretation of a statute or zoning ordinance is a 
question of law for the Court, the determination of what uses are 
accessory uses customarily incidental to a single-family dwelling 
is a question of law. 
id . (citations omitted). The Court in Alta noted earlier in its opinion that "We accord 
conclusions of law no particular deference but review them for correctness." Thus 
it fol lows that if the appellate court provides no deference to the trial court for its 
conclusions of law (including the interpretation of County zoning ordinances), the trial 
court likewise provides no deference to conclusions of law made by the Board of 
Adjustment. See also Beaver County vs. Utah State Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344 
(Utah 1996); Patterson, 893 P.2d at 605. 
Thus, the trial court was free to determine, without deference to the Board of 
Adjustment or its reasoning, the proper interpretation of the requirements of the 
Development Code for a permitted use. Interpretation of the Development Code is a 
"pure question of law." No presumption exists in favor of the decision of the Board 
of Adjustments and it would be improper to simply determine if substantial evidence 
existed to support this conclusion of law. 
Summit County's attempts, in its appellate brief, to distinguish the applicable 
law cited by Red Barn is likewise misguided. While the cases Alta, Sandy City, and 
Beaver County do not involve decisions of boards of adjustment, they do involve the 
interpretation of law, as did Patterson. And as set forth in Patterson, there can be no 
dispute that a question involving the proper interpretation of an ordinance is a question 
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of law for which no deference is accorded to the Board. Clearly, it was appropriate 
for the trial court to review the record before the Board of Adjustment without 
affording any deference to the Board's erroneous interpretation of the Development 
Code. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE DOES NOT 
REQUIRE RED BARN'S PROJECT, A PERMITTED USE 
WITHIN THE RESORT COMMERCIAL ZONE, TO SUBMIT 
TO A PRELIMINARY SITE PLAN AND FINAL SITE PLAN 
APPROVAL PROCESS. 
A. Statutory Construction of the Snyderville Basin Development Code. 
Summit County begins Section II of its brief by reciting five "rules" of statutory 
construction which bear on the interpretation of an ordinance. Red Barn concurs with 
four of the five "rules" cited by Summit County: 
(i) "the interpretation must be based on the intent of the legislative body 
enacting the ordinance," which intent is "ascertained from the plain 
language of the ordinance;" (ii) "the ordinance must be construed as a 
whole to give effect to the overall policy or general purpose which it is 
intended to promote;" (iii) "an interpretation should be avoided if it 
renders any part of the ordinance meaningless, superfluous, void or 
insignificant;" and (iv) "a provision treating a matter specifically prevails 
over an incidental reference made thereto in a provision treating another 
issue." 
(Appellant's Brief at 29-31 ).1 These rules of construction only support the trial court's 
conclusion that the Development Code is clear in its distinction that preliminary and 
*Red Barn does not agree with Summit County's fifth "rule" of construction~if a term is not 
defined it is appropriate to rely on the interpretation of that term by local zoning officials and that if 
a term is ambiguous, the zoning agency's interpretation should control if reasonable and sensible 
(Appellant's Brief at 31). Red Barn contends that this "rule" is irrelevant for three reasons: (i) the 
Development Code is not ambiguous, but rather clear and unequivocal; (ii) there is no Utah law to 
support the contention that an undefined term should be defined by the local zoning officials; and 
(iii) if the Development Code is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the landowner 
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah App. 1995). 
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final site plan approval is not required for a permitted use (R. 429). Plaintiff contends 
that the Development Code is not ambiguous regarding the absence of any required 
site plan approval for a permitted use. If an ambiguity exists, it is created by the 
Defendant ignoring the express language of the Development Code. 
B. The Snyderville Basin Development Code Does Not Require Preliminary and Final 
Site Plan Approval for a Permitted Use. 
Section 3.5 of the Development Code identifies appropriate and 
compatible uses within various zones established by the Development Code. 
According to subparagraph (d) of Section 3.5, Allowable Uses shall be those set forth 
in Schedules contained in Section 3.6, which are then categorized as either a permitted 
use or a conditional use (R. 208). Section 3.6(a) specifies as fol lows: 
The following rules shall be used to interpret the Schedule of Uses: 
(1) If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted 
subject to the general requirements for specified uses within the 
zoning district, this Chapter [Chapter 3] , and the applicable 
performance standards set forth in Chapter 5 of this Code. No 
permitted use shall be established until all required permits are 
obtained including, at a minimum, a development permit. 
2) If the symbol "C" appears in the cell, the use is permitted 
subject to the conditional use permit procedures and standards 
specified in Section 3.7 herein, the performance standards set 
forth in Chapter 5 of this code, and any other standards set forth 
in this Code which may be applicable to such use. 
(R. 208-09). Relying expressly upon the requirements of the foregoing Section, a 
permitted use is subject only to the requirements of Chapter 3 and the general 
requirements for specified uses, while a conditional use requires compliance with the 
additional standards of Section 3.7 (and by incorporation Section 4.6). Again the 
intended use of Red Barn's property is a permitted use, not a conditional use. The 
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requirements of Chapter 4 of the Development Code are, therefore, inapplicable to a 
permitted use. 
If the intended use of the Red Barn property were a conditional use, and it is 
not. Red Barn would be required to comply with the provisions of Section 3.7. Section 
3.7 (R. 202-04) specifies in express terms that a conditional use shall not be 
established until a site plan has been approved (specifically referring to Section 4.6), 
and then only after review and recommendation by the Planning Commission and 
approval by the Board of County Commission (Sections 3.7 (b) and (c)). No similar 
express provision exists for a permitted use which requires either the approval of a site 
plan or approval before the Planning Commission or the Board of County Commission. 
To the contrary, the express language of Section 4.6 defining requirements for 
Site Plans provides as fol lows: 
(a) Applicability. The following applications shall be required 
to obtain site plan approval: 
(1) Requests for zoning map amendments to mixed 
use, commercial, or industrial zoning districts; and 
(2) Requests for conditional use approval. 
(R. 176-77). In this case, the Summit County Development Office and the Board of 
Adjustments ignored the express language of the Development Code to require a Site 
Plan approval (both preliminary and final) for Red Barn's permitted use. 
Although factually different from the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals 
held in Logan City vs. Huber. 786 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah App. 1990) that it would 
not "rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language to reach a constitutional 
construction." When interpreting the Development Code in this case, Summit County 
F \WORD\AN\PROWSWOO\REDlBRF WPD -12-
would have the trial court and this Court ignore the express language of Sections 3.6, 
3.7 and 4.6 which is unambiguous and does not require site plan approval for a 
permitted use. "When divining the meaning of . . . statutes, it is reasonable to 
interpret terms so that the language used makes sense when taken as a whole." 
Wright v. University of Utah. 876 P.2d 380, 384 (Utah App. 1994). To require Red 
Barn to obtain a site plan approval makes the language of the foregoing Sections 
nonsensical. Summit County's position that Red Barn must have a site plan approval 
is, therefore, unsupportable. 
C. Where the Plain Language of the Development Code is Clear. This Court Should 
Not Look Beyond the Same to Divine Intent. 
Utah appellate courts "are guided by the rule that a statute [or ordinance] should 
generally be construed according to its plain language." Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 
P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah App. 1997): see also Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 
686 (Utah 1989): Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 
1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction."). Furthermore, in Patterson, this 
Court stated: 
[Blecause zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property 
owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her 
property, provisions therein restricting property uses should be 
strictly constructed, and provisions permitting property uses 
should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner. 
898 P.2d 602, 606. Rather than accepting this time honored principle of construction, 
Summit County attempts to persuade this Court to look to the provisions set forth in 
Chapter 4 of the Development Code-which clearly does not apply to permitted 
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uses—as well as other irrelevant sections of the Development Code and the Snyderville 
Basin Administrative Guidelines (the "Guidelines") in order to impose requirements upon 
Red Barn which simply do not exist. Summit County's rationale for citing irrelevant 
portions of the Development Code and Guidelines as well as outside authorities is that 
"the ordinance must be construed as a whole to give effect to the overall policy or 
general purpose," and if a term is undefined or ambiguous, "it is appropriate to rely on 
the interpretation of that term by the local zoning officials" and "the zoning agency's 
interpretation should control." (Appellant's Brief at 30-31). However, these principles 
simply do not apply where the Development Code is not ambiguous. 
(1) Chapter 4 of the Development Code is not applicable to a Permitted Use. 
Summit County contends that certain sections of Chapter 4 of the Development Code 
dictate the requirements for Red Barn to obtain a building permit, when in reality, they 
do not. Ignoring, temporarily, Red Barn's assertions that Chapter 4 has no application 
to a permitted use, examination of Summit County's assertion that Section 4.12 (b) 
controls the requirements for issuance of a building permit, suggests the absurdity of 
Summit County's interpretation of the Development Code.2 This Section states in 
pertinent part that "[a]ny applicant for a building permit shall submit an approved final 
site plan, final subdivision plat, and if applicable, a conditional use permit. . . ." (R. 
172). Thus, if Chapter 4 applies to Red Barn's permitted use, it would also require 
every other applicant for a building permit, including one applying for a building permit 
for a residential home located in a previously approved subdivision, to obtain an 
2
 Summit County also relies upon essentially identical language of Section 12.2(1) of the 
Administrative Guidelines which pursuant to Section 2 are non-binding upon Summit County. 
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approved final site plan-meaning approval from the Planning Commission and the 
Board of County Commissioners. Summit County does not contend that a single 
family applicant must obtain a site plan approval but asserts that the language of 
Section 4.12 (b) is satisfied because most lots are located within approved 
subdivisions.3 However, Defendant again ignores the express language of this Section 
which states that at a minimum both an approved site plan and an approved 
subdivision plat are required for a building permit. Again, the only logical reading of 
this Section 4.12 and its additional requirements is in the context of a conditional use 
permit, which requires additional requirements beyond those of a permitted use. (R. 
172). 
(2) Other provisions of Utah Law and the Development Code require building 
permits. Summit County suggests that Section 4.12 must apply to Red Barn's project 
since it is the section that refers to the requirements for building permits (Appellant's 
Brief at 35, 40). However, Section 4.12 is not the only reference in the Development 
Code to building permits. As set forth in Section 3.6(a)(1), Red Barn concedes that 
it must obtain a building permit and it must comply wi th the applicable requirements 
of Chapter 5 (R. 207-08). Chapter 5 also defines the need for a building permit.4 
Section 5.17 (a) specifies that construction "of any building or structure or any part 
thereof, including all structures or uses of which plans have been approved as part of 
3
 Summit County asserts that a single family applicant can file an Application for a Minor 
Permit avoiding the requirements of this Section 4.12(b). However, Section 7.65 or 4.12 does not 
exempt those requesting Minor Permits. Furthermore, Minor Permits do not expressly cover "Lots 
of Record." Thus, it appears that the Director has arbitrarily excluded single family applicants from 
the requirements of Section 4.12. 
4Section 17-27-1002 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) also sets forth the 
requirement of a building permit. 
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a rezoning, site plan, subdivision plat, conditional use permit or development 
agreement, shall not be commenced until a building permit is obtained from the county 
building inspector" (emphasis added) (R. 146). By reference to these requirements in 
the disjunctive, the language of this Section clearly expresses an intent that one need 
not have an approval if it is not required elsewhere. Since by the language of other 
sections a rezoning, site plan, subdivision plat, conditional use permit or development 
agreement is not necessary for Red Barn's intended use, a building permit must be 
issued for a permitted use without further approval. Again, this Section must be read 
in harmony wi th the others. If Section 4.12 controls all circumstances for permitted 
and conditional uses (even though it is inconsistent), there is no need for Section 5.17. 
That was clearly not the intent of the Development Code. 
(3) Section 6.14 of the Development Code is not applicable to this matter. 
Summit County makes frequent reference in its appellate brief to Section 6.14(a)(1) 
of the Development Code for the proposition that a final site plan is required before a 
building permit is issued for a permitted use (Appellant's Brief at 37, 39-40). 
However, the language relied upon by Summit County has been taken out of context 
of Chapter 6 of the Development Code. Section 6.14 is clearly found in the chapter 
of the Development Code dealing only wi th subdivisions and public improvements (R. 
139-43). Section 6.14(a) and 6.14(a)(1) provide as fol lows: 
6.14 Issuance of Building Permits and Certificates of 
Occupancy 
L. 
M SuhjOQt TO Except as provided in Section 
5.17(d) of this Code, no building permit shall 
be issued for a lot or building site unless all 
public improvements as reuired for any 
applicable subdivision plat or site plan have 
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been completed, or are part of an 
improvement agreement as per Section 6.9 of 
this Code, as attested to by the Director and 
County Engineer and all applicable service 
providers. 
(1) The Director may authorize building 
permits for non-residential and multi-
family dwellings provided that a final 
site plan has been approved by the 
County and construction plans have 
been released by the County Engineer. 
(R.140). Because Section 6.14(a)(1) is an exception to the general requirements of 
Section 6.14(a) that all public improvements must first be competed before a permit 
is issued, this Section has no application to the interpretation issue before the Court 
and Summit County's reliance upon this section is unfounded. 
(4) The Guidelines support Red Barn's and the trial court's interpretation of the 
Development Code. Summit County's recitation of Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines 
does not support the plain language of the Development Code. In Appellant's brief, 
Summit County contends that the Guidelines specifically require "either an approved 
Final Site Plan or Final Subdivision Plat prior to issuance of a Building Permit" 
(Appellant's Brief at 35-36). However, these guidelines are not binding. Section 2 of 
the Guidelines expressly states that "these Administrative Guidelines shall not be 
considered binding on the County . . . and shall not supersede any contrary provision 
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code." (R. 82). Summit County, then, asserts 
that the Guidelines are relevant in interpreting the Development Code, even though 
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they are non-binding upon Summit County and Summit county's use of the Guidelines 
is in direct conflict wi th express provisions of the Development Code.5 
Red Barn asserts that other provisions of the Guidelines support its 
interpretation. Section 4.4.3 of the Guidelines specifies in chart form the various type 
of "development permits" provided in the Development Code and the time frames for 
consideration and/or response by various bodies of the County. One such category is 
that of a "Building Permit, use by right." (R. 80, 413). For a "Building Permit, use of 
right," proceedings before all bodies (including the Planning Commission and the Board 
of County Commissions) except that of the Director is designated "n/a" , presumably 
meaning not applicable. This constitutes an expression of intent by the Board of 
County Commissioners, who adopted the Guidelines, that a party applying for a 
building permit for a use designated by right (a "permitted use") need not obtain a 
preliminary or final site plan approval which would require an appearance before the 
Planning Commission and/or the Board of County Commissioners. These Guidelines 
are, therefore, consistent wi th Red Barn's and the trial court's interpretation of the 
Development Code, which is that a preliminary and final site plan approval process is 
not required for a permitted use. 
The plain language of the Development Code clearly sets forth the requirements 
for obtaining a building permit for a permitted use. Morever, even if there is some 
ambiguity in certain portions of the Development Code, the entire Development Code, 
5
 In Summit County's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Summit 
County asserts that the Guidelines require compliance (R. 397). It appears that Summit County 
wishes the Guidelines to be binding upon citizens and non-binding upon the County. 
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when read as a whole, clearly evidences the intent of the County to distinguish 
between permitted uses and conditional uses when delineating the requirements for 
obtaining a building permit. 
D. The Development Code Distinguishes Between Permitted Uses and Conditional 
Uses. 
Summit County devotes an entire section of their brief of appeal to the mistaken 
proposition that the trial court somehow sua sponte amended and rewrote the 
Development Code by adding two new definitions to the Development Code: a 
"permitted use building permit/ ' and a "conditional use building permit." (Appellant's 
Brief at 44-46). Summit County is simply wrong in this assertion. The trial court did 
not create new defined terms by referring to a permitted use building permit and a 
conditional use building permit (R. 429); rather, the trial court was merely 
acknowledging that the Development Code distinguishes between permitted uses and 
conditional uses. The trial court could have just as easily referred instead to a "building 
permit for a permitted use" and a "building permit for a conditional use," without 
changing the meaning of the trial court's conclusion. The trial court's simple 
truncation of its references to the different processes for obtaining a building permit 
does not amount to legislation from the bench. Summit County's assertion that it 
does is absurd and should be wholly disregarded by this Court. 
Where the Development Code clearly does not require a site plan approval 
process in order for Red Barn to obtain building permits to construct the Timberwolf 
Lodge, the trial court was correct in so finding. Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
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the trial court's interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code and reject 
Summit County's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/Appellee Red Barn respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the trial court's determination that the interpretation of the 
Development Code is a matter of law properly reviewed for correctness and further 
affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 
29, 1998. 
DATED this / / day of Marohr+S^8. 
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